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Yena Lee majored in philosophy at Yale College, where she both en-
joyed and rued a distinctly Socratic education. Though the unfortunate-
ly bite-able gadfly shaped several parts of her learning, the most cher-
ished effect is found in an observation from Kierkegaard: “In Socrates, 
philosophy was still just (N.B. this still just)—still just a life.” Accord-
ingly, she hopes to pursue graduate studies in philosophy in ethics, 
ancient or medieval philosophy, or Kant. Studies aside, she is also inter-
ested in the demographics of academic philosophy, which she hopes 
and believes—if ancient flux metaphysics is to be trusted—is chang-
ing.    
E 
tymologically related to the broaching of limits, the 
sublime constitutes a phenomenon of surpassing gran-
deur or awe. Kant and Hegel both investigate the sub-
lime as a key element of aesthetics and develop their 
accounts within two distinct aesthetic frameworks. For Kant, the 
sublime is part of a larger theory of reflective judgment and 
hence captures a subjective phenomenon. For Hegel, the sublime 
is a part of a larger theory of world spirit being captured in exter-
nal form and so also constitutes an objective phenomenon. The 
accounts thus differ at the metaphysical core: the sublime is sub-
jective for Kant and objective for Hegel. In this paper, I compare 
the two theories and show that despite the ontological difference, 
they agree on the sublime’s close link to morality. Both accounts 
argue the sublime’s potential of encouraging individuals to-
wards the conduct of a good, moral life. Finally, I conclude with 
an evaluation of the sublime’s fit within the respective frame-
works of Kant and Hegel and address a potential weakness in 
each theory. 
 
I. Accounts of the sublime  
For Kant, the sublime lies in a feeling of man’s superiority 
over nature. It is the second type of aesthetic judgment, with the 
first type of judgment being the beautiful. The sublime divides 
into the mathematic and the dynamic. First, the mathematically 
sublime awakens the faculty of reason’s superiority to imagina-
tion. When an individual sees an enormous magnitude in nature, 
the “voice of reason” demands that it be understood it in its to-
tality.1 Imagination, the faculty responsible for judging empirical 
magnitudes, strives to provide the totality. But it fails: as it ap-
prehends progressive parts of the object, it loses the parts it had 
previously apprehended. Because of the object’s sheer magni-
tude—in this case, an infinite of the sensible world—the imagina-
tion loses on one side as much as it gains on the other. Thus, im-
agination cannot fulfill reason’s demand for a totality, and the 
realization of this inadequacy creates displeasure. But the inade-
quacy quickly gives rise to something else: a realization of a su-
persensible faculty that can comprehend the infinite. Kant’s 
proof, roughly, proceeds: imagination cannot comprehend an 
absolutely great magnitude, i.e., infinity, but I can think of an 
infinite as a whole. Therefore, I must have another faculty within 
me that allows me to comprehend this infinite.  
This faculty is reason, and we find pleasure in discovering it. 
The mathematically sublime lies in this discovery, or more spe-
cifically, “the disposition of the mind” that results from finding a 
faculty suitable to infinity.2 This faculty is superior to the imagi-
nation, which even “in all its boundlessness…[pales in]  insignifi-
cance beside the ideas of reason.”3 It is this mental disposition 
that constitutes the sublime, not the object of nature that prompts 
the reflection. Though we loosely speak of the sublime being in 
nature, “true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the 
one who judges.”4 
This disposition rouses the proper feeling for practical law. It 
is “compatible with that which the influence of determinate 
(practical) ideas on feeling would produce”5—that is, the feeling 
of respect. The imagination’s inadequacy produces this respect. 
Though imagination cannot give us an absolute whole, an abso-
lute whole that can be given “is one enjoined on us by a law of 
reason.”6 We respond with respect, the “feeling of inadequacy of 
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our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us… 
thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our 
[recognizing that idea as law].”7 
The dynamically sublime demonstrates our superiority over 
nature in recognizing that neither internal nor external nature 
has power over us. An individual is displeased to recognize his 
powerlessness before the brute power of “deep ravines and the 
raging torrents in them.”8 But displeasure again gives rise to 
pleasure because it allows for the discovery of a “capacity of re-
sistance of quite another kind”9 that is, the resistance to nature in-
side of us. This resistance to internal nature is one in which our 
humanity remains “undemeaned” against “those things about 
which we are concerned (goods, health, and life)… to which we 
are, to be sure, subjected.”10 The dynamically sublime, then, is 
again “in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being 
superior to nature within us and thus also to nature outside us.”11 
Here Kant uses “nature” in two ways: (a) the nature of the deep 
ravine; and (b) the nature of human inclination (as opposed to, 
say, duty). To our pleasure, we discover in this reflection that “if 
it came down to our highest principles,” we have the power to 
reject internal natural inclinations. This capacity of quite another 
kind, in turn “gives us the courage to measure ourselves 
against”12 external nature, the power of the deep ravines. 
Like the mathematically sublime, the dynamically sublime 
establishes a disposition compatible to the demands of practical 
reason. The discovery of the capacity to resist nature causes the 
subject to “recognize in himself a sublimity of disposition suita-
ble to God’s will.”13 This understanding, Kant notes, separates 
religion from superstition: superstition leads to fear, not recogni-
tion of this dignity to resist internal and hence external nature. 
Religion, in contrast, leads to “the good conduct of life.”14   
Hegel takes up the same notion of the sublime as “the at-
tempt to express the infinite.”15 However, for Hegel, the infinite 
is grounded in something external to the subject: the one abso-
lute substance, Spirit. Sublimity for Hegel has an ontological 
meaning, as it is “grounded in the one absolute substance qua the 
content which is to be represented.”16 The absolute spirit is sub-
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lime because it transcends adequate representation or expression 
in finite phenomena.   
Hegel’s sublime comes in context of the three stages of art: 
the symbolic, classical, and romantic epochs. Each of these stages 
corresponds with a development of the world spirit and its fit 
with phenomenal form. In the symbolic stage, the spirit is too 
undetermined to be captured in form. In the romantic stage, the 
spirit is too determined to be captured in form. The classical 
stage, found in the human statues of the ancient Greeks, produc-
es the apex of art because the spirit is just developed enough to 
be perfectly expressed by form. These three stages break down 
into smaller stages; the sublime constitutes one of the latest stag-
es of the symbolic epoch.  
Though Eastern art forms approximate the sublime, the sub-
lime “strictly so-called”17 is found in Hebrew poetry, the Psalms. 
These reveal the sublimity of God because they represent all of 
existence as completely dependent upon God. Humanity and the 
rest of the world are a “serving accident and a transient show in 
comparison with God’s being and stability.”18 In other words, 
humanity depends on God for existence and only exists to praise 
this sustaining power. Hegel cites Psalm 104, which depicts God 
covering himself with light as a garment, and stretching out the 
heavens like a curtain: nothing, not light nor heaven, exists in or 
for itself. It is but “an external vesture” for God.19  
The sublimity represented herein is therefore a negative rela-
tionship. God himself cannot be represented by phenomena, as he 
transcends finitude. But the complete contrast between this Ab-
solute and the finite can furnish, at the least, a negative under-
standing. The Psalms represent God as the all-powerful, all-wise, 
eternal creator. Everything else “is and subsists only by God’s 
might and is there in order, in praise of this might.”20 This ex-
pression of the sublime is therefore negative, built off the abso-
lute distinction between God and creation.21 
In this distance of the infinitely different God lies the abstrac-
tion of Spirit: Hegel introduces the spirit of the sublime as “at 
least the foundation of the spirit… [but] not yet apprehended as 
concrete.”22 That is, in understanding only the negative relation-
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ship—the difference between God and us—we find no develop-
ment of spirit that will come in later stages, which requires a 
more positive relation. First, this abstract spirit reveals no human 
immortality, as yet only the One is absolute, and finitude perish-
es. Second, we feel unworthiness, pain, and fear before God be-
cause of the recognition of our difference. Third, we encounter 
the potential for wickedness that is counter to the absolute spirit. 
These three points will presumably develop as spirit grows more 
concrete, i.e., through the Christian God addressing each: human 
immortality through resurrection, worthiness through reconcilia-
tion to God through Christ, and forgiveness and sanctification of 
wickedness. At this stage, the sublime insofar as it represents a 
negative relationship is still abstract, and thus belongs in the 
realm of the symbolic rather than the classical or romantic.  
Nonetheless, Hegel concludes his discussion of the sublime 
with room for an “affirmative” relationship between humans 
and the sublime spirit.23 “On the one hand,” he writes, there is 
the law that arises from the “substantial peace and constancy of 
God in respect of his will and his commands for men.” On the 
other hand, there is a recognition of the “complete and clear dis-
tinction between the human and the Divine.” An individual rec-
ognizes she is utterly distinct from the Divine, in that God sus-
tains her and the rest of the world. But she also recognizes that 
the will that sustains the world also wills commands for her to 
follow. From here, she finds an “affirmative relation to God” inso-
far as she adheres to these commands, God’s laws. Adherence to 
the laws, i.e., adherence to the will of the Spirit, “is transferred to 
the individual,” and each decision for good “accru[es] to the in-
dividual” to build a positive relationship between the otherwise 
completely distinct and incommensurable finite and Absolute.  
 
II. Comparisons 
Kant and Hegel’s notions of the sublime thus differ at the 
metaphysical core. For Kant, the sublime is a subjective judgment 
contained within the individual. For Hegel, it is grounded in 
something objective and external to the subject, the absolute Spir-
it. While Kant investigates the question “What does it mean for 
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me to judge this as sublime?”—a question about our subjective 
judgment, Hegel questions, “What is the sublime?”—a question 
about metaphysics. Such a question is not up for discussion in 
Kant’s framework of cognition, which approaches metaphysics 
from the side of possible human cognition. In contrast, Hegel be-
lieves the objective side of things is within our grasp 
and criticizes Kant for “[falling] back again into the fixed opposi-
tion between subjective thinking and objective things.”24 
A broader point of disagreement between the two is the rela-
tionship between the form of the sublime and its content or pur-
pose. For Hegel, art always requires some correspondence be-
tween form and content; a perfect correspondence between the 
two results in true art, as in the classical epoch. Even when they 
fail to perfectly match, as is the case in the symbolic and roman-
tic, the general rule still remains that art requires some corre-
spondence between form and content. 
In contrast, Kant finds form and content not only to not corre-
spond, but to directly clash in the sublime: “that which excites in 
us the feeling of the sublime, may to be sure appear in its form to 
be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our 
faculty of presentation.”25 He continues that this contrapurpos-
iveness does “violence to our imagination, but is nevertheless 
judged all the more sublime for that.” In Kant’s subjective sys-
tem, “form” is the mental representation of an object that resists 
the purposiveness, or content, of judgment. The form of the sub-
lime, Kant claims, is particularly unsuited to the purpose. I will 
return to this claim below, in the discussion of Kant’s overall aes-
thetic system.  
Though Kant and Hegel diverge on the nature of the sublime, 
notable similarities in the accounts still emerge. First, though na-
ture is related to the sublime, sublimity is not, strictly speaking, 
contained in nature. For Kant, the subject’s mental disposition 
constitutes the sublime, and for Hegel, the sublime is found in 
the negative relationship between finite nature and infinite Spir-
it. Subsequently, for both philosophers, no sensuous form ade-
quately expresses the sublime. Additionally, both accounts con-
tain a negative moment that leads to something positive: a reali-
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zation of a noble power within humans that relates to moral law. 
For Kant, the negative moment of realizing the inadequacy of 
imagination and powerlessness before nature leads to the posi-
tive moment of discovering reason and our power over nature. 
This positive realization leads to a disposition of the mind com-
patible with a feeling of respect. In the dynamically sublime, we 
also recognize the capacity within ourselves to resist natural in-
clinations (and hence obey moral law). Likewise in Hegel, the 
representation of the negative relationship between the finite and 
the divine prompts a recognition of good and evil, and our pow-
er to obey or resist law, God’s commands. These decisions 
“accrue” to us and begin to constitute an affirmative relation 
with the giver of these laws. Granted, for Hegel, the revelation in 
the direction of morality needs further development, and does 
not play as large a role in his theory. In contrast, for Kant, the 
positive moment is a defining characteristic of the sublime. Re-
gardless, for both, the negativity initially apparent in the sublime 
reveals a positive moment of elevation for human nature that 
suits the individual to moral conduct.    
 
III. Evaluation 
The two theories may resist more immediate comparisons 
because each operates within a specific aesthetic framework. For 
Kant, the sublime fits in as a type of aesthetic judgment, and for 
Hegel, the sublime fits in as a development of spirit through the 
epoch of symbolic art. I will briefly situate the sublime into each 
framework, and provide one possible weakness of the theory as 
it fits within its system.  
For Kant, there are two types of aesthetic judgment: of the 
beautiful and of the sublime. The two share the primary marks of 
an aesthetic judgment. First, both the beautiful and sublime 
please for themselves. Unlike a judgment of taste, say that a cer-
tain wine is tasty, the object of aesthetic judgment offers no 
pathologically conditioned satisfaction. The subject is not inter-
ested in the object judged as beautiful or sublime; she does not 
want it as she may want the wine. Second, beautiful and sublime 
judgments are judgments of reflection rather than of cognition. 
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An individual makes a cognitive judgment by subsuming a par-
ticular intuition under a determinate concept. For example, the 
specific intuition could be “this wine,” and the concept, “types of 
alcohol.” The judgment, “this wine is a type of alcohol,” consti-
tutes a cognitive judgment because it requires a judgment to be 
made through a concept. In contrast, an aesthetic or subjective 
judgment arises from relation between subject and an object. The 
sublime therefore does not judge the object of nature to be sub-
lime, but judges the mental disposition when viewing nature. 
Similarly, the beautiful judgment does not judge an object as 
beautiful, but judges the human satisfaction from viewing the 
object. Finally, beautiful and sublime judgments are both neces-
sary and universally valid for everyone. Taste varies from person 
to person, but what is judged as beautiful or sublime must be 
beautiful or sublime for all. Given these marks of a subjective 
judgment and the sublime’s fulfillment of said marks, the sub-
lime seems to fit well within Kant’s system of aesthetic judg-
ments. 
But the beautiful and the sublime differ in key respects that 
highlight the unique contribution of each aesthetic judgment to 
morality. What are these unique contributions? Beauty forms a 
symbol of morality itself, while the sublime forms the subjective 
response to morality. Kant writes that a judgment of beauty 
transports our reflection on one object of intuition (a beautiful 
object) to “another, quite different concept, [that of morality,] to 
which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond.”26 In 
other words, the reflection arising from surveying a beautiful 
object reflects the reflection that would arise from morality’s ob-
ject, if it had one. The beautiful reflection hence symbolizes the 
beautiful. On the other hand, the sublime highlights the subjec-
tive side to morality – i.e., the feeling for moral law (respect), and 
the realization of our power to resist natural inclination in adher-
ence to the law. The sublime relates not to morality itself, but the 
subjective feeling to morality within each individual. Differences 
between the beautiful and the sublime should thus reflect this 
difference in relation to morality. 
Which they indeed do: first, beauty and the sublime differ in 
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pleasure: beauty pleases immediately, which, Kant claims, is simi-
lar to the effect of morality.27 The sublime, on the other hand, 
pleases indirectly through negativity. This negativity affords the 
respect that disposes our mind for the proper feeling of respect 
for moral law. Second, they differ in their suitability to judgment: 
beauty carries purposiveness in its very form, whereas the sub-
lime appears contrapurposive to our power of judgment. Be-
cause beauty carries purposiveness in its form, “we must seek a 
ground outside ourselves” for the objects judged as beautiful.28 
The grounding of morality, of course, lies outside of us. In con-
trast, the sublime appears contrapurposive to our judgment. The 
contrapurposiveness form does “violence to our imagination” 
and so reveals the faculty of reason, an internal power. The 
ground for the sublime, then, we find “merely in ourselves and 
in the way of thinking”—a mental power within the subject.  
This last point on contrapurposiveness, as mentioned earlier, 
runs counter to Hegel’s notion that content and form should cor-
respond, even if imperfectly. However, because Kant’s con-
trapurposiveness gives way to purposiveness, viz., the pleasure 
that arises from discovering reason, Hegel may have the better 
understanding of the relationship between form and content. For 
Kant, form may initially oppose content, but the two ultimately 
match because form leads to purposiveness, the discovery of rea-
son. Further, the match is not just any match, but one of perfect 
correspondence: “the subject’s own incapacity reveals the con-
sciousness of an unlimited capacity of the very same subject, and 
the mind can aesthetically judge the latter only through the for-
mer.”29 Because the arrival to consciousness of reason can happen 
only through the initial contrapurposiveness, this match seems to 
be, in the end, an example of form perfectly matching content. 
The form that initially resists judgment through the imagination 
is ultimately the only grounds through which this content can be 
brought about. Thus, it is possible that Hegel, not Kant, has the 
better understanding of content and form corresponding in aes-
thetics.  
Hegel’s aesthetic system traces the spirit’s development from 
abstraction to concretion: in the epoch of the symbolic, spirit is 
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too abstract to find adequate expression in phenomenal form. 
The height of the symbolic is found in Egyptian art, which pre-
dates sublime art. An independent spirit, notably manifest 
through ideas of the afterlife, appears in Egyptian art. Yet it is 
still indeterminate, and even the Egyptians do not fully under-
stand it. This abstraction makes Egyptian art the paradigm case 
for symbolic art: in symbolism, “the shape was the chief thing. It 
was supposed to have a meaning, yet without being able to ex-
press it perfectly.”30 In other words, Egyptian art, in its form, ob-
scurely points to (or symbolizes) something outside itself. 
Symbolism proper can no longer capture spirit when it devel-
ops into the stage of the sublime, one of the final stages of sym-
bolism. The sublime differs from the strictly symbolic in two 
ways: first, there is no adequate “configuration in something ex-
ternal, and thus far the strictly symbolic character vanishes.”31 
Because the sublime so utterly transcends finite form, no trace of 
a fit between the symbol and the content remains. Second, the 
negative relationship is demonstrated without ambiguity—thus 
“in contrast to… symbol and its obscure content there is now the 
meaning as such and its clear intelligibility.”32 A “symbol prop-
er… does not get beyond striving after the spiritual”33—i.e., a tru-
ly symbolic representation only obscurely points to spirit. Be-
cause the contrast between the finite and infinite is so clear, sym-
bolism of the sublime lacks the vague striving, or pointing after, 
character of true symbolism.  
But Hegel’s theory of the sublime may look unfit for the sym-
bolic at the point at which the negative relationship turns posi-
tive. The epoch of the symbolic, with all its stages, is categorized 
by the indetermination of spirit. Is the spirit still adequately ab-
stract by the time it reaches the sublime? The suspicion regarding 
Hebrew poetry is that, unlike Eastern or Egyptian art forms, it 
expresses the spirit of the true Spirit: God. The safeguard against 
over-development came from the entirely negative understanding 
of Spirit and human spirit: the revelation of the sublime empha-
sized the finitude of man and the incommensurable God. But if 
the sublime can lead to the start of an affirmative relationship 
that relates to the moral nature of man, the spirit involved 
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sounds more like concrete spirit.  
This, however, may not be a large problem for Hegel. Typi-
cally for Hegel, the end of each stage already begins to resemble 
the face of the next. He does, at the least, have further develop-
ments of absolute spirit (e.g., immortality), which justify the 
claim that the sublime still lacks determinacy.  
 Kant and Hegel both develop theories of the sublime with 
substantial metaphysical differences which nonetheless overlap 
in a push towards elevating the subject towards morality. Both 
integrate the notion of the sublime with success into their aes-
thetic frameworks: for Kant, in supplying an aesthetic judgment 
related to morality in a way distinct from a beautiful judgment; 
and for Hegel, in supplying a necessary step in the progression 
of a spirit still adequately undeveloped through the epoch of 
symbolic art.  
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